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Michael T. Hertz*
In Doyle v. Doyle, ' the defendant in a civil action moved to set
aside the service of a writ of summons on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction of the Newfoundland Supreme Court. The defendant,
resident and domiciled in Montreal, was arrested there on December
7, 1973, and taken under police escort to St. John's. He was
released on bail on December 11 but was required to remain in
Newfoundland until final disposition of the fraud case for which he
had been arrested. On December 17 a writ was issued against him
from the Newfoundland Court and on December 18 it was served on
him in Newfoundland. This action was one for arrears of
maintenance under a Quebec judgment. 2 The defendant asked that
the writ and service thereof "be set aside ... on grounds that he
was only found within the jurisdiction of the Court where service
could legally be effected because he was brought into Newfound-
land compulsorily by the police' '.3
The Court rejected the defendant's contentions. It distinguished
situations where civil process has been set aside where a defendant
was induced to enter the jurisdiction by fraud,4 such decisions being
founded on the principle that service in such instances amounts to an
abuse of process of the Court. 5 Where no such fraud existed, 6 or
even where a defendant was compelled by military obligations to be
*Michael T. Hertz, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 143 (Nfld. S.C.).
2. Doyle v. Doyle (No. 2) (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 315 (Nfld. S.C.). The Quebec
Court had ordered interim payments of alimony pending hearing and determination
of the divorce petition in Quebec, under s.10(a) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. D-8. The plaintiff asked for recognition of this interim order as a foreign
judgment by the Newfoundland Court, although in fact, as the latter noted, the
action should have been one for registration under s. 15 of the Divorce Act. The
result would have been the same, though, because in fact the Quebec judgment was
intended to have no effect after determination of the divorce petition, which had
been already decided against the plaintiff: (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 315 at 318 (Nfld.
S.C.).
3. (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 143 at 144.
4. E.g., Watkins v. North American Land & Timber Co. (1904), 20 T.L.R. 534
(H.L.).
5. (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 143 at 145.
6. Colt Industries, Inc. v. Sarlie, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 440; [1966] 1 All E.R. 673
(C.A.).
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within the jurisdiction, 7 service could be made properly. "I can find
no precedent," the Court concluded, "for saying that an
involuntary or accidental entry into the jurisdiction renders a person
safe from service of process. . .. The general position seems to me
to be perfectly clear and that is that once a person comes within the
jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Court then he is liable to such
directions as those Courts on behalf of the Sovereign direct".
8
The Court's position seems supportable under English authority,
notably the case of Pooley v. Whetham.9 Pooley was brought to
England from Paris under extradition on a charge of offences
against the bankruptcy laws. While Pooley was in prison awaiting
trial, the defendants obtained an order to lodge a writ of attachment
with the governor of the prison, so that when Pooley was released
he should be handed over to a second prison. Pooley was acquitted
of the charges under the bankruptcy laws and then transferred to
another prison on the writ of attachment. He applied for discharge to
the Vice-Chancellor, who refused to release him. On appeal, the
order was affirmed. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that
nothing prevented the service of the writ of attachment while Pooley
was in prison, even though he was there under the Extradition Act,
as the Act itself did not require such a privilege, and the criminal
charges against Pooley had been laid bona fide and not merely to
bring him to England for the purposes of serving the civil writ of
attachment. 10 There being, therefore, no abuse of the Court's
process, the attachment would remain.
The American position has diverged in important respects from
the English and Canadian, to such an extent that one can fairly say
7. Lawrence v. Ward, [1944] O.W.N. 199; [194412 D.L.R. 724 (H.C.).
8. (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 143 at 145-6.
9. (1880), 15 Ch. D. 435 (C.A.).
10. Id. at 444. The American view is otherwise. See, e.g., Smith v. Canal Zone
(1918), 249 F. 273 (5th Cir.) and Re Reinitz (1889), 39 F. 204 (C.C.N.Y.). The
rule has been enacted into statute in many states so that a person brought into the
state by extradition could not be subject to service of process in a civil action
arising out of the same facts as the criminal prosecution. The reason for this rule
was that, in its absence, many state governors were reluctant to sign extradition
papers on the grounds that such extradition was often used solely as a means of
getting a debtor within the borders of a state where his creditors resided. See
Thermoid Company v. Fabel (1958), 4 N.Y. 2d 494 at 500-501; 176 N.Y. S.2d
331 at 335-336. Some states extended the rule to cover even civil causes unrelated
to the criminal action. See, e.g., Murray v. Wilcox (1904), 122 Iowa 188; 97 N.W.
1087 (defendant extradited on felony charges immune from suit for breach of
promise to marry).
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that there is substantial American authority for the proposition that
involuntary entry of a non-resident to face criminal charges does not
subject him to civil service of process. Furthermore, the use of
service of process within the territory of the Court as the sole
justification for taking jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
has been under attack. In this light it is worth commenting on the
American divergence from the English common law and the
American experience in this area.
Under English law, witnesses, jurymen, and prosecutors are
protected eundo, morando, et redeundo I from civil arrest whether
in attendance on a civil or criminal matter, 12 the latter being where
they are free on recognizance. 13 The privilege does not extend to
arrest for criminal offences, 14 nor does it extend to service of
process as opposed to civil arrest. 15 The latter distinction appears to
be uncontradicted by the scanty Canadian authority. 
1 6
Some early American cases clung to the distinction between
allowing a privilege from civil arrest but not with respect to a
summons. 17 But other courts, particularly in Pennsylvania 18 and
New York, 19 extended the privilege to service of summonses, the
reason being given generally that, without a privilege, necessary
witnesses would be discouraged from giving evidence2" and parties
would be subject to inconvenience in attending court in distant
places. 2
1
11. The King v. Hall (1776), 2 B1.W. 1110; 96 E.R. 655 (K.B.). The privilege has
existed from the earliest times. Note (1920), 33 Harv. L. Rev. 721 at 722 n. 4;
Note (1910), 23 Harv. L. Rev. 474 at n. 1.
12. Gilpin v. Cohen (1869), L.R. 4 Exch. 131 at 134.
13. Id.
14. Quebec Liquor Comm'n v. Bastien, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 514 (Que. K.B.).
Accord, United States v. Conley (1948), 80 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass.).
15. Poole v. Gould (1856), 25 L.J. Ex. 250 (Ex.). Accord, Parker v. Hotchkiss
(1849), 18 Fed. Cas. (No. 10,739) 1137 (comparing English and Pennsylvania
law).
16. Quebec Liquor Comm'n v. Bastien, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 514 (Que. K.B.);
Gibbons v. Tuttle (1906), 9 Nfld. L.R. 186; Burke v. Sutherland (1840), 1 Kerr.
166 (N.B.).
17. See, e.g., Page v. Randall (1856), 6 Cal. 32; Legrand v. Bedinger (1827), 20
Ky. (4 T.B. Mon.) 539; Hunter v. Cleveland (1802), 1 Brev. 167 (S.C.).
18. Hayes v. Shields (1797), 2 Yeates 222 (Pa.), citing Bolton v. Martin (1788), 1
Dall. 296 (Pa. Comm. P1.) (member of legislature privileged from service of
summons).
19. Person v. Grier (1876), 66 N.Y. 124.
20. Atchison v. Morris (1882), 11 F. 582 at 585 (C.C.N.D. Il1.).
21. Hayes v. Shields (1797), 2 Yeates 222 (Pa.).
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In 1809, Justice Washington of the United States Supreme Court,
sitting on circuit, decided that the extension of the privilege to
summonses need not be made by the federal courts,22 preferring the
English to the Pennsylvanian approach. Forty years later, and
despite a practice "which has been acquiesced in and acted upon by
the whole profession," 23 Justice Washington's decision was
overruled in a decision which had the support of then Chief Justice
Taney of the Supreme Court. The Court said:
It is said that the practice of this court, since the decision in Blight
v. Fisher . . , has been uniform to discharge in such cases as
this, from arrests under capias, but not to set aside the service of a
summons. I confess that I have never apprehended the reason of
this distinction, and when it was pressed upon me by the counsel
for the plaintiff, I did not disguise my reluctance to accede to it
The privilege which is asserted here is the privilege of the court,
rather than of the defendant. It is founded in the necessities of the
judicial administration, which would be often embarrassed, and
sometimes interrupted, if the suitor might be vexed with process
while attending to testify. Witnesses would be chary of coming
within our jurisdiction, and would be exposed to dangerous
influences, if they might be punished with a lawsuit for
displeasing parties by their testimony; and even parties in
interest, whether on the record or not, might be deterred from the
rightfully fearless assertion of a claim or the rightfully fearless
assertion of a defence, if they were liable to be visited on the
instant with writs from the defeated party.
As the privilege of the court, this incidental immunity to the party
can scarcely be the subject of abuse. It can be exercised or not in
each particular case, as the purposes of substantial justice may
seem to require. [Citation omitted]. The suitor or the witness
from another jurisdiction may be relieved: he who is at home here
amongst us, suffering no inconvenience from the service, may be
refused his discharge .... 24
This reasoning took firm root in the United States, and it has been
applied generally to protect witnesses, suitors, and attorneys in
attendance on a civil cause of action from service of process in
another.2 5 In criminal matters, witnesses, attorneys and jurymen are
likewise protected, but the position of criminal defendants is less
clear.
22. Blight v. Fisher (1809), 3 Fed. Cas. (No. 1542) 704 (C.C.N.J.).
23. Parker v. Hotchkiss, 18 Fed. Cas. (No. 10,739) 1137 (C.C.E.D. Pa.).
24. Id. at 1138.
25. Lamb v. Schmitt (1931), 285 U.S. 222 at 225; 52 S. Ct. 317 at 318.
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There is a split of authority with regard to non-resident criminal
defendants 26 in situations where a non-resident defendant in a
criminal action has voluntarily entered the state, where he has
returned after being released on bail, and where the defendant has
come involuntarily into the state to stand trial.
Where there is a voluntary submission by the defendant to
criminal trial, most American courts will grant immunity from civil
service of process. The leading New York case of Thermoid
Company v. Fabel2 7 is indicative of the approach taken here. Fabel
was indicted in a New York Federal Court for defrauding the
government of the United States. A warrant could have been issued
out of the New York Federal Court and executed upon Fabel to
remove him from North Carolina to New York. Fabel obviated this
procedure by surrendering to the New York Court, posting bail, and
returning to North Carolina. After standing trial and receiving a fine
and suspended jail sentence, Fabel was served on the courthouse
steps in a civil suit connected to the fraud case.
The privilege was upheld. The purpose of the privilege "is to
encourage voluntary attendance upon courts and to expedite the
administration of justice". 28 Where the attendance was not
voluntary the suitor or witness would not be protected as he would
have no choice but to attend and could not influence the expeditious
handling of the case. 29 The fact that Fabel could have been forced to
come to New York by execution of the warrant was not compelling
because he had obviated the necessity of putting legal machinery in
motion. 3
0
Some courts have gone further, however, and have held that even
one involuntarily present in the state can be given immunity. In
Feuster v. Redshaw, 31 the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted this
view where the defendant was free on bail and
... he might possibly have obviated the necessity for his return
for the trials by remaining away and forfeiting the collateral
26. United States v. Conley (1948), 80 F.Supp. 700 at 702 (D.Mass.) (per
Wyzanski J.).
27. (1958),4 N.Y. 2d 494; 176 N.Y.S. 2d 33 1.
28. Id. at 499; 176 N.Y.S. 2d at 334, citing Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham
(1910), 197 N.Y. 377 at 380; 90 N.E. 962 at 963.
29. Id.
30. The court distinguished this situation from one involving extradition as none
was needed: (1958), 4 N.Y. 2d at 500-501; 176 N.Y.S. 2d at 335-336.
31. (1929), 157 Md. 302; 145 A. 560.
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deposited.32
Still, he could be said to be involuntarily before the Court. Nor,
added the Court, could it be said that a non-resident defendant in a
civil suit was in "voluntary" attendance, yet he was granted a
privilege from service in other actions. The Court also emphasized
the need to prevent the party defendant from being harassed,
distracted or intimidated by the prospect of other litigation. Church
v. Church33 likewise rejected the notion that only voluntary
appearances would be protected, saying that
[i]t would border on an abuse of process to force a person to come
within the jurisdiction for one purpose, say that he may be
prosecuted for a crime, and then subjected to other litigation, for
which he could not have been compelled to leave the state of his
home. 3
4
The case has been overruled, however, on the grounds that, where
the defendant was within the jurisdiction "in response to his
obligation under a bond in a criminal proceeding growing out of
alleged offences committed [here] . . . the principal reason for the
immunity,- namely, to encourage voluntary cooperation with
judicial administration, is absent".
35
Sentiments similar to those expressed in the Church case may,
though, be found in other judgments. In United States v.
Bridgman, 36 almost on all fours with the situation in Thermoid Co.
v. Fabel, the Court said that the non-resident defendant, voluntarily
appearing to a federal indictment, was in reality compelled to do so,
and yet would be privileged from service with any civil process. In
Kaufman v. Garner, 3 7 the Court rejected a distinction between a
civil defendant and a criminal accused, stating that such a
distinction would, in the main, appear to be based on the notion of
treating the criminal harshly and, in the light of the presumption of
innocence, should not be condoned. 38 The Court felt that the
privilege in the two cases
.. .is based upon considerations alike of public policy and the
dignity and independence of the court first acquiring jurisdiction,
32. Id. at 304; 145 A. at 562.
33. (1921), 270F. 361 (D.C. Cir.).
34. Id. at363.
35. Greene v. Weatherington (1962), 301 F. 2d 565 at 568 (D.C. Cir.).
36. (1879), 24 Fed. Cas. (No. 14, 645) 1230 (C.C. E.D. Wis.).
37. (1909), 173 F. 550 (C.C. Ky.).
38. Id. at 554.
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as well as the idea that such attendance is under compulsion
39
In Dwelle v. Allen,40 Judge Learned Hand dealt with the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary appearances. In that
case, the non-resident defendant was in New York to plead to a
federal indictment. After paying his fine, he was served with a
summons to appear before a grand jury. After appearing to the
summons, he was served with civil process. Judge Hand decided
that no distinction should be made between a witness voluntarily
appearing and one under subpoena.
. T]he proper test is not ... whether the appearance be
voluntary or not, but whether the privilege will promote the
purposes of justice. It would certainly be a strain upon one's
confidence in the sanctions of process to say that the privilege
would not conduce obedience.
41
Judge Hand examined the leading New York case at the time,
Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham.42 In Netograph, the defendant
was served with process after being acquitted in a New York
criminal trial. The defendant had, after his indictment, gone back to
Ohio on recognizance and returned. The New York Court of
Appeals "declined to vacate the process, on the ground that his
release from custody on recognizance still left him in the custody of
his bail, and that his subsequent appearance was not voluntary.' 43
While recognizing that the privilege has a lesser impact in
persuading criminal defendants to return to court when they are out
on bail, Judge Hand thought that "there is at least an argument that
the custody of bail is not such that it will surmount the possible
deterrent which might arise from liability to civil suit".4
Commenting on the tendency of federal courts to grant a criminal
defendant immunity from civil process, Judge Charles Wyzanski
39. Id. See also Adamy v. Parkhurst (1932), 61 F. 2d 517 (6th Cir.); Alla v.
Kornfeld (1949), 84 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. 111.); Martin v. Bacon (1905), 76 Ark.
158; 88 S.W. 863.
40. (1912), 193 F.'546 (S.D.N.Y.).
41. Id. at 548-49.
42. (1910), 197 N.Y. 377; 90 N.E. 962.
43. (1912), 193 F. 546 at 547. Compare E. W. Hinton, Note (1925), 20 111. L.
Rev. 172 at 177 (criticizing technical holding that release on bail left defendant in
"custody"), with A. Keeffe & J. Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality (1947), 32
Corn. L.Q. 471 at 488 (viewing rule as logically necessary and desirable)
[hereinafter "Keeffe"].
44. (1912), 193F. 546at548.
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has written that there is some reason to doubt that the Supreme
Court would follow this trend.
45
The Court might conclude that neither the dignity of attendance
upon a federal court, or the desire to conduce a criminal
defendant to obedience, or the purpose of encouraging a criminal
defendant to vindicate himself, or the policy of not interfering
with or embarassing federal court proceedings required the
allowance of any such protection against civil litigation. 
46
The policies listed by Judge Wyzanski in support of the privilege
are not of equal importance, and some are not particularly
compelling. 47 Yet before concluding that no privilege should be
accorded to the criminal defendant involuntarily within the
jurisdiction, one should ask: Who is hurt by the immunity from civil
service of process which such defendants might enjoy? The persons
affected by such immunity granted to civil defendants are third
parties who wish to bring an action against the immunized
defendant and who cannot bring an action against the defendant
without serving him within the court's territory. 
48
Solicitousness for the plight of the resident plaintiff as opposed to
the nonresident defendant was doubtless not misplaced when courts
had limited power to serve such defendants extra-territorially. In the
United States, that limitation was cast in constitutional terms in the
1877 case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 49 which removed from the states the
power to pass Order XI rules for service ex juris on the model of
those established by the English Common Law Procedure Act,
1852.50 The American constitutional impediment was destroyed in
1945 with International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 51 and the
development of "long-arm" statutes has since led to broad local
power in American states to subject nonresident defendants to their
jurisdiction.
The privilege from service of process does not protect
nonresident defendants against service ex juris. Whatever the
45. United States v. Conley (1948), 80 F. Supp. 700 at 702 (D. Mass), noting the
approving citation of Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham in Lamb v. Schmitt (1932),
285 U.S. 222 at 226; 52 S. Ct. 317 at 318.
46. Id. at 703.
47. See generally, Keeffe, supra, note 43 at 473-81 (criticizing the immunity
doctrine generally).
48. Id.
49. (1877), 95 U.S. 714; 24 L. Ed. 565.
50. 15 and 16Vict., c. 76.
51. (1945), 326U.S. 310; 66 S. Ct. 154.
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reasons for having the privilege, all courts have agreed that it
applies to nonresidents only. The policy behind the privilege is to
limit the nonresident's burden when he comes within the territory of
the court and thereby loses an advantage which residents do not
have. But when entry into the state is no longer a sine qua non for
service in a civil suit, the protection is no longer relevant. Those
American courts faced with the issue have agreed that
[a] nondomiciliary who could be served outside the state cannot
claim immunity from service if he is served [within the state],
even if he is here voluntarily and in the aid of justice. 52
The development of efficient extraterritorial jurisdiction has, on
the other hand, increased the tempo of attacks upon mere presence
of the defendant and service of process upon him on that basis as a
functionally acceptable means of obtaining jurisdiction over him.
The inadequacy of this rule, and its contrast with the law
prevailing elsewhere in the world, has often been stressed. A rule
compelling the traveller "to run the gauntlet of such litigation
under treat of snap judgment" offers "premiums to scavengers of
sham and stale claims at every center of travel". The rule "may
result in trying the suit in a State in which no part of the operative
facts occurred and in which neither of the parties lives," so that
"the defendant may be called upon to defend in a place with
which he is unfamiliar", and the forum may not be "in a
favourable position to deal intelligently either with the facts or
with the law" .53
In sum, in the era of the "long-arm" statute, the plaintiff who
argues for a narrower immunity from service of process is in a far
less appealing position than before. If the plaintiff must rely on
service of process within the territory of the court in order to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant, this means that neither the
defendant nor the cause of action has a sufficient nexus to the
territory to permit service ex juris. In turn, this means that the
invocation of local jurisdiction rests on a tenuous basis, and
consequently attention should be paid to any interest which the
defendant can advance to show that he should be immunized from
such service.
52. Gardner v. United States (1965), 246 F. Supp. 1014 at 1015 (S.D.N.Y.).
Accord, Chauvin v. Dayon (1961), 14 App. Div. 2d 146; 217 N.Y.S. 2d 795; Silfin
v. Rose (1959), 17 Misc. 2d 243; 185 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (Sup. Ct.). Cf. Christian v.
Williams (1892), 1II Mo. 429; 20 S.W. 96. See also Severn v. Adidas
Sportschuhfabriken (1973), 33 Cal. App. 3d 754; 109 Cal. Rptr. 328.
53. A.A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
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Two American Courts have recently moved to abolish the
privilege generally. 54 Commentators reviewing these decisions
have found them laudable to the extent that they restrict an
indisciminate application of the privilege, but a significant number
have criticized the flat elimination of the privilege, on the basis
noted here: that physical presence should be de-emphasized as a
jurisdictional basis and "the litigant's immunity be kept intact...
to provide nonresidents with a fair opportunity to protect their
interests in the forum state." 
55
With the American experience in mind, we can now turn to the
situation in Canada. Only three reported Canadian cases56 even
touched on this area prior to the Doyle decision, so it can hardly be
said that there is settled Canadian precedent on the matter. The
historical influence of English law should not deter examination.
The need for the privilege increases in a multi-jurisdictional setting,
and the English experience could be easily disregarded as unsuitable
to a federal country like Canada.5 7 Why, though, has the issue not
arisen before this?
Aside from the closer ties between Canadian and English law,
two differences between the Canadian and American situations may
be suggested as suppressing the development of the privilege in
Canada. First, since the days immediately following Confederation,
criminal law has been a federal matter and defendants and witnesses
in criminal trials have been subject to nationwide summonses and
warrants. 58 Compared to the United States, where one state could
prevent the extradition of fugitives to another state and in which
Myth and Forum Conveniens (1956), 65 Yale L.J. 289 at 289-90. See also P.M.
North, Cheshire's Private International Law (9th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974)
at 81; H.E. Read, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
Common Law Units of the British Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1938) at 150-51.
54. Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken (1973), 33 Cal. App. 3d 754; 109 Cal.
Rptr. 328; Wangler v. Harvey (1963), 41 N.J. 277; 196 A.2d 513.
55. Note (1964), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1346 at 1349. Accord, S. Thompson, Note
(1974), 10 Cal. West. L. Rev. 646 at 651-652; L.C. Schubert, Note (1974), 26
Hastings L.J. 512 at 534; Note (1964), 64 Colum L. Rev. 1157 at 1161-62.
56. Supra, note 16.
57. Canadian courts have, of course, found English statutes and common law to be
inapplicable to local conditions. E.g., Re G., G. v. C., [1951] 3 D.L.R. 138; 2
W.W.R. 271 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Cyr (1918), 38 D.L.R. 601; [1917] 3 W.W.R. 849
(Alta. S.C., A.D.).
58. An Act respecting Procedure in Criminal Cases, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 29, ss. 23,
25-26. Compare the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, C-34, ss. 461, 631-32.
Doyle v. Doyle 613
criminal law was largely state controlled, there was little impetus in
Canada to encourage voluntary submission by defendants and
witnesses to courts trying criminal actions. Voluntary submission,
as in Thermoid Co. v. Fabel, 59 was perhaps desirable, but the
critical need for immunity was lacking. This does not, however,
explain why the privilege failed to develop to protect participants in
civil actions.
The second factor may have been the early development of
service ex juris in Canada, following closely on the 1852 English
legislation. With such power in the courts' hands, the need to
encourage attendance by non-residents appeared to be lessened. In
fact, of course, judgments rendered on the basis of service exjuris
were not recognisable in other provinces unless the defendant
actually submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 60 That in turn
should have encouraged the growth of the privilege. Yet perhaps it
would have been too contradictory for a court to encourage
submission through the grant of a privilege to a person over whom
the court already claimed in personam jurisdiction.
While service ex juris is not sufficient to render a judgment
recognisable in other provinces, an in personam judgment based on
the defendant's mere presence within the jurisdiction will be
enforced in Canada. 61 It could be argued on this basis that
unencumbered62 use of the transient rule of jurisdiction should be
continued. Yet the fact that some judgments should be recognized
but are not does not mean that a court should take jurisdiction in
other cases where recognition will for historical reasons be accorded
but the basis for jurisdiction is inappropriate.
There are some instances when use of presence alone is
appropriate. A good example is MacAulay v. O'Brien, 63 where a
British Columbia court took jurisdiction over a temporarily present
Yukon resident. At the time of the case, there were no courts in the
Yukon, and British Columbia was the closest place where
jurisdiction could be had over the defendant. Similarly, in Doyle's
case, if the husband removed all of his assets from Quebec when he
59. (1958), 4 N.Y. 2d 494; 176 N.Y.S. 2d 331. See text accompanying notes
27-30, supra.
60. E.g., Deacon v. Chadwick (1901), 1 O.L.R. 346 (D.C.).
61. Forbes v. Simmons (1914), 20 D.L.R. 100; 7 W.W.R. 97 (Alta. S.C.).
62. Except for the convenience doctrine. E.g., Sittler v. Conwest Exploration Co.
(1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 631 (N.W.T. C.A.).
63. (1897), 5 B.C.R. 510 at 515 (.C.).
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was arrested in order to leave nothing there for his wife, it would be
defensible to take jurisdiction in Newfoundland. The position is
strengthened because the Newfoundland action was merely for the
enforcement of a Quebec judgment. Newfoundland was surely no
less convenient for Doyle than would be any jurisdiction outside
Quebec.
In conclusion, there is probably good reason in Canada to look
closely at the development of a limited privilege, if not by judicial
action at least by legislation. Where the mere presence of witnesses,
suitors, attorneys, and other persons is their sole connection with a
particular jurisdiction, they should be granted immunity from local
service of process in the interest of encouraging their full and free
attendance on the court matters in which they are initially
concerned, of eliminating possible disruption in the first proceed-
ings, and, in general, of leaving the fairness of the first action
unprejudiced by the threat of service of process in the second.
Where the person being served in the second action can be served ex
juris, or where there are other factors which would make the local
forum convenient to him, the privilege should not be invocable.6
However, the burden of showing that the privilege should not apply
should rest upon the plaintiff, who is attempting to utilize mere
presence as his jurisdictional basis.
64. In Wangler v. Harvey (1963), 4 N.J. 277; 196 A.2d 513, the Court abolished
the privilege in favour of using a forum non conveniens test under which the
defendant would be exempted from local jurisdiction if he affirmatively showed
that it was unfair to subject him to that jurisdiction. Compare Logan v. Bank of
Scotland (No. 2), [1906] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A.); Sittler v. Conwest Exploration Co.
(1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 631 (N.W.T. C.A.). The forum non conveniens doctrine,
however, does not account for the need to induce certain non-residents to come into
the forum's territory. Note (1964), 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1157 at 1161. Nor does it
focus on the fairness of requiring defence in the second action as a cost of
participating in the first. For these reasons, the Wangler approach is an
unsatisfactory substitute for the privilege.
